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We study stock returns over the period of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and identify three
crisis “shock factors” related to unique features of the crisis:  (1) the collapse of global demand, (2)
the contraction of credit supply, and (3) selling pressure on firms’ equity. All three of these “shock
factors” are reflected in large and statistically significant influences on residual equity returns during
the crisis period (after controlling for normal risk factors that are associated with expected returns).
Similar analysis for the placebo period of August 2005-December 2006 shows that the influences identified
during the 2007-2008 sample period are unique to the crisis. A month-by-month analysis shows that
the time variation of the importance of each of the shock factors tracks related changes in the global
economic environment.
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I.  Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 was a significant shock to the financial system and the 
global economy. The shock that originated in the US mortgage market and banking system 
reduced the supply of credit, led to distressed sales of risky assets as banks and investors 
scrambled to shore up their liquidity and capital ratios, and plunged the global economy into a 
severe recession, one in which economic activity slowed or contracted, and global trade 
collapsed. While the crisis originated in the US and other developed economies, it quickly spread 
over the globe, affecting all economies, which saw their stock prices collapse as investors 
panicked. 
Stock returns are a unique measure of performance that is comparable across firms and 
countries, forward-looking, comprehensive in scope, and insensitive to differences in accounting 
rules. In normal times, a firm’s stock returns reflect a combination of expected returns (its 
loadings on risk factors) and residual returns that are associated with firm-specific news. At 
times of significant economy-wide shocks, however, the cross-section of residual returns can be 
understood as reflecting the exposure of firms to unexpected shocks.  
Three categories of crisis-related shocks – reduced global product demand, contraction in 
the supply of credit, and selling pressure in the equity markets – could have contributed to the 
decline of equity prices worldwide during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. These shocks were 
unexpected prior to the crisis. In this paper, we consider whether the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 was a unique event from the standpoint of stock returns and isolate crisis-related “shock 
factors” that can explain the cross-section of residual returns during the crisis. 
Our strategy is to construct measures of “shock factors” for each of the three categories 
of shocks described above and then identify their relative contribution to the observed declines in 3 
 
equity returns. As a measure of sensitivity to global product demand shocks, we employ 
measures of global trade exposure. The sensitivity to selling pressure is captured by the structure 
of stock ownership and stock trading prior to the crisis. We measure firms’ sensitivity to credit 
supply shocks through a combination of variables relating to the capital structure, its dividend 
behavior, and the ability of the firm to cover its debt obligations.  
We use data on over 17,000 firms in 44 countries around the world to study whether 
cross-sectional stock returns over the period of August 2007 to December 2008 can be explained 
by the crisis “shock factors” described above. We exclude US firms in order to focus on factors 
that were associated with the global spread of the crisis. We use a methodology similar to Tong 
and Wei (forthcoming) which employs a cross-sectional model of stock returns and captures 
expected returns with a standard set of control variables.
1 In this framework, our “shock factors” 
capture unexpected influences of crisis-related shocks on residual stock returns. Empirically, we 
use values from 2006 to construct our shock factors, which are based on firm characteristics 
observed prior to the crisis. We then compare our results for the crisis period with a similarly 
structured model of the “placebo” period that runs from August 2005 to December 2006 and uses 
predetermined values from 2004 to construct shock factors.  
To preview our results, we find that credit supply shocks, global demand shocks and 
selling pressures in the equity market had negative influences on stock returns during the crisis 
but positive or not significant effects during the placebo period. Our results are robust to three 
ways of modeling the influence of “shock factors”: (1) as three sets of individual variables that 
enter separately as regressors in the model of residual returns, (2) as the first principle 
component of the set of individual regressors used to measure each category of influence, and (3) 
                                                            
1 Tong and Wei (forthcoming) follow Whited and Wu (2006) in incorporating Fama and French (1992) factors 
directly in cross-sectional regressions of returns.  4 
 
as dummy variables that divide firms in groups according to combinations of regressor values. 
Furthermore, our results do not change if we use a local instead of a global measure of beta as a 
control or if we conduct weighted estimations to reduce the importance of countries that have 
many firms in our sample. Finally, our main findings are similar if we conduct separate 
estimations for firms in developed and developing countries. 
A month-by-month analysis shows that the time variation of the importance of each of 
the “shock factors” tracks related changes in the global economic environment. The magnitude 
of the negative coefficients associated with the global demand shock factor rises during times of 
greatest decline in exports. Time variation in the coefficients associated with the credit-supply 
factor are similar to those found in credit risk spreads that reflect the timing of credit-supply 
shocks.  The variation over time in the coefficients that measure the stock market selling pressure 
shock factor closely tracks the variation in the returns to the stock market. 
While our methodology builds on Tong and Wei (forthcoming), our focus is different. 
Tong and Wei explore the role of country-level exposure to financial globalization, specifically 
through the composition of capital flows. They also find an important firm-specific factor in 
cross-sectional returns related to financial dependence (specifically, working capital financing 
needs). Our focus is entirely on firm-specific “shock factors” which arise as a result of an 
unexpected crisis event. We abstract from the effect of country characteristics by using country 
fixed effects. Didier, Love, and Martinez Peria (2010) provide a detailed analysis of country-
specific factors in aggregate equity returns during the crisis. In considering firm-specific factors, 
we explore a broader range of firm characteristics, both relating to financing structure and other 
characteristics of firms than did Tong and Wei. 5 
 
We find that each of the three categories of crisis-related shock factors accounts for 
significant proportions of the declines in equity prices observed during the crisis. Of course, it is 
not possible to completely disentangle the influences of demand contraction, credit scarcity, and 
selling pressure through these three shock factors. Each of our three measured shock factors is 
likely to have been influenced by all three sources of shock. Nevertheless, we argue that the 
dominant influences on each of the three shock factors are likely to be primarily traceable to one 
of the three categories of shocks. 
This paper is related to the growing literature on the origin and consequences of the 
crisis. Most of the existing papers have focused on the causes and consequences of the crisis and 
thus have mostly analyzed its epicenter, the United States.
2 A few others have studied the global 
transmission of this crisis. For instance, Fratzscher (2009) and Obstfeld, Shambaugh, and Taylor 
(2009) focus on the transmission via exchange rates. Dooley and Hutchison (2009) provide 
evidence of transmission to credit default swap spreads in emerging markets. Rose and Spiegel 
(2009a and 2009b) conduct an analysis of the international propagation of the crisis based on a 
measure of crisis incidence and severity which combines changes in real GDP, stock markets, 
credit ratings, and exchange rates. However, these papers use macro data to analyze the 
incidence and determinants of the propagation of the crisis. Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and Mehl 
(2009) study the transmission of the US 2007-2008 crisis to stock markets around the world by 
focusing on the performance of about 450 industry-equity portfolios across 64 countries. That 
paper emphasizes primarily on the role of macro factors on the performance of industry 
portfolios rather than the role of the crisis shock factors we consider here. 
                                                            
2 See Caprio, Demirguc-Kunt, and Kane (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2008), Brunnermeier (2009), Calomiris 
(2009), Cecchetti (2009), and Taylor (2009), among many others. 6 
 
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II explains our approach to 
identifying shock factors. Section III describes the data and empirical model. Section IV presents 
our main empirical results for the global cross-section of stock returns during the crisis, and 
shows that our identified shock factors played a uniquely important role in explaining equity 
returns during the crisis, as compared with the pre-crisis “placebo” period. Section V presents a 
number of robustness checks on our baseline results and confirms that our main findings do not 
change.  Section VI examines the cross-section of returns during the crisis period in more detail, 
performing a month-by-month analysis of the changing importance of shock factors over time. 
Section VII concludes. 
 
II.   Identifying Shock Factors 
  Global Demand Shock  
  The financial crisis was associated with a remarkable decline in global trade. World 
exports fell by 9 percent between July 2007 and December 2008. This decline reflected a variety 
of potential influences, including the sensitivity of export financing to credit supply contraction 
(Amiti and Weinstein 2009, Chor and Manova 2009). Our interest, of course, is not in explaining 
export decline, but rather using the crisis-related collapse in exports to measure firms’ differing 
sensitivity to the decline in global demand during the crisis. Firms that had positioned 
themselves prior to the crisis to be more dependent on trade were relatively more vulnerable to 
global demand shocks during the financial crisis. We, therefore, measure global demand shock 
sensitivity using firm-specific variables that capture the exposure of a firm to global trade. Our 
two measures are (1) the firm’s pre-crisis proportion of sales outside the company’s home 
country, and (2) the proportion of company assets held outside the company’s home country. 7 
 
Stock Market Selling Pressure Shock 
There have been numerous studies of the effects of the crisis and the role of credit 
contraction and illiquidity crisis-induced selling on the redemptions of money market debts and 
the widening of bond spreads. These studies identify important effects of correlated selling 
pressure traceable to illiquidity problems in generating the contraction of quantities and the 
declines in prices in different debt markets.
3  
In publicly traded equity markets, crisis-related shocks should have had even greater 
consequences than in debt markets, given the consequences of the crisis for firms’ immediate 
and future incomes and their debt financing options. Just as in debt markets, problems of 
“funding illiquidity” for investors in publicly traded firms (due to declines in investor equity, 
rising market volatility, and the decline in available credit), should have been transformed into 
“market illiquidity” as owners of publicly traded shares were forced to liquidate their shares. 
Billio, Pelizzon, Getmansky, and Lo (2010) examine correlations in returns across different 
equity investors and document apparent crisis-specific linkages in returns that they argue reflect 
this selling pressure.
4  Additionally, publicly traded firms’ expected performance was itself 
affected by declining expected sales and by contraction in the supply of credit. Equity selling 
pressure, therefore, should have magnified declines in share prices that reflected the influences 
of declining demand and tight credit in reducing the discounted expected future cash flows of 
firms.  
                                                            
3 See Schwarz (2009) on the Libor market, Heider, Hoerova and Holthausen (2009) on the Euribor market, Gorton 
and Metrick (2010) on the repo market, Corvitz, Liang, and Suarez (2009) on the asset-backed commercial paper 
market, Duca (2010) on the commercial paper market, and Mitchell and Pulvino (2010) on the bond market. 
4  Cella, Ellul, and Giannetti (2010) find that investors with short trading horizons are inclined or forced to sell their 
holdings to a larger extent than investors with longer trading horizons, amplifying the effects of market-wide shocks 
on stock prices. 8 
 
We measure the sensitivity of a firm’s equity to selling pressures in the stock market 
using two variables: pre-crisis free float relative to the total market value of equity, and pre-crisis 
stock turnover (the volume of trading relative to outstanding market value of equity). These 
measures are intended to capture the relative liquidity of a stock prior to the crisis.  
In contrast to the findings for the literature on liquidity effects in debt markets, we find 
that relatively liquid stocks experience the greatest declines during the crisis. In theory, the effect 
of stock liquidity on returns is ambiguous. On the one hand, greater liquidity may be associated 
with steeper declines in equity prices, as investors select their most liquid risky assets to sell 
during a liquidity squeeze. On the other hand, liquidity becomes more valuable during a crisis, 
implying that relatively illiquid stocks may experience relative price declines. Our findings 
indicate that during the recent crisis the former effect was dominant.  
Of course, the meaning of observed relative declines related to relative liquidity is 
controversial. One could argue that relatively illiquid stocks also experienced similar or even 
larger “shadow” declines in value during the crisis, which were masked by the lack of sales of 
these illiquid stocks. In other words, had someone tried to sell a large amount of an illiquid stock, 
its price would have been much lower. Selectivity bias related to endogenous decisions to sell, 
therefore, complicates the interpretation of the meaning of the effects of liquidity on stock 
returns during the crisis. 
 
 Credit-Supply Shock  
Several studies show dramatic declines in credit supply during the crisis. Ivashina and 
Scharfstein (2009) find that banks curtailed new lines of credit, and thus, that credit supply 9 
 
contracted much faster than would be apparent by only examining outstanding aggregates 
amounts of commercial and industrial lending. Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) survey 
chief financial officers (CFOs) of 1,050 firms in 40 countries after the September 2008 market 
collapse and find that a substantial proportion of those surveyed report that they were forgoing 
positive net present value investments due to financing constraints.
5 Almeida, Campello, 
Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2010) find that firms that are more exposed to debt rollover risk 
experienced much greater investment decline during the financial crisis.
6 
Although the contraction of credit supply affects all firms, either directly (through 
reduced credit) or indirectly (through reduced demand by customers who face reduced credit), 
some companies should be harder hit by a contraction in credit supply than others. Companies 
with intrinsically high costs of external finance – for example, small, growing firms, specializing 
in new products, or with short histories of public trading – will find their prospects of attracting 
financing reduced relative to other firms during times of general economic contraction, or credit-
supply stringency.
7  
For a given degree of exogenous difference in the costs of external finance, a company 
with higher leverage and lower cash flows relative to debt service requirements (i.e. interest 
coverage) prior to the crisis should experience greater vulnerability to credit supply shocks 
associated with a financial crisis. All firms experience reductions in their “debt capacities” 
                                                            
5 “[T]he inability to borrow externally caused many firms to bypass attractive investment opportunities, with 86% of 
constrained U.S. CFOs saying their investment in attractive projects was restricted during the credit crisis of 2008. 
More than half of the respondents said they canceled or postponed their planned investments.” 
6 Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira and Weisbenner (2010) use long-term debt maturing in the near term as a 
particularly exogenous indicator of firms’ exposures to rollover risk. They argue that while a reliance on short-term 
contractual debt may proxy for other firm attributes, long-term debt maturing in the near term is a purer measure of 
exposure to rollover risk.  
7 There is a long literature examining indicators of firms’ costs of external finance. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 
(1988) used dividend payout as their key indicator. Dividend payout may reflect other differences, and has been 
criticized in some studies (Kaplan and Zingales 1997, but see the response by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen 2000, 
and the further evidence in Campello and Chen 2010 and Almeida, Campello and Weisbach 2004).    10 
 
during a crisis (the maximum degree of leveraging that their cash flow prospects will permit); 
therefore, companies with high leverage and lower interest coverage prior to the onset of a credit 
crunch will be more adversely affected than other firms, as credit supply constraints will be more 
likely to bind on them.
8   
Thus, vulnerability to credit-supply shocks should reflect both the exogenous external 
finance costs of the firm and its endogenous financial choices. To capture both sorts of 
contributors to financial fragility, we considered a variety of measures that had been identified in 
the literature, and settled on a subset of indicators that capture endogenous leverage choices as 
well as exogenous characteristics related to external financing costs.
9  
Previous research on the effects of financial constraints on stock returns confirms that the 
effects are relatively pronounced during macroeconomic downturns. Lamont, Polk, and Saa-
                                                            
8 A large body of empirical and theoretical research supports the view that “corporate finance vulnerability” should 
matter for the cross-section of stock returns (Anginer and Yildizhan, 2010 is an exception), and that it should matter 
more for the cross-section of returns in adverse states of the world (i.e., recessions, credit crunches, or financial 
panics). The theoretical foundations of “corporate finance vulnerability” for stock returns dates back to the seminal 
work of Brock and LeBaron (1990), who showed that financing constraints (i.e., differences in the marginal cost of 
external finance across firms and across time) could explain variation in stock returns above and beyond those 
predicted by standard risk models. Brock and LeBaron (1990) showed that an adverse macroeconomic shock should 
cause a larger decline in the stock returns of financially constrained firms (those with relatively high costs of 
external finance) than other firms. With respect to the effects of leverage in magnifying financial constraints, Sharpe 
(1994) and Calomiris, Orphanides, and Sharpe (1994) find that although high leverage tends not to be useful for 
explaining cross-sectional differences in investment and employment decisions during expansions, during recessions 
US firms that had chosen to increase their debt to high levels during the preceding booms suffered larger 
contractions of employment, fixed investment and inventory accumulation in reaction to declines in their sales 
growth during the recession. In other words, highly levered firms experience relatively large declines in expected 
cash flows in adverse economic states, but not in other economic states.  
9 Unlike Tong and Wei (2010) we do not confine our investigation to exogenous influences on external finance 
dependence related to working capital. We consider financial structure characteristics more broadly for two reasons. 
We note that working capital use, like other financial structure characteristics is endogenous to firm-specific costs of 
external finance. Calomiris, Himmelberg and Wachtel (1995) show that, ceteris paribus, firms that face greater 
external financing constraints tend to choose combinations of productive factors that make greater use of working 
capital. While that finding supports Tong and Wei’s emphasis on working capital to measure financing constraints, 
it also indicates that their measure is endogenous to choices that reflect financing constraints, which are related more 
broadly to age, opacity, and other firm characteristics. We do not regard endogeneity as a problem; on the contrary, 
we believe that it makes sense to consider the ways in which endogenous choices of firms’ financing structure make 
them differentially vulnerable to crisis-related credit-supply shocks. We consider a wide range of such measures. In 
particular, we show that endogenous decisions by firms – for example, the decision to increase leverage – mattered 
for firms’ sensitivity to the crisis. 11 
 
Requejo (2001) surprisingly found “no evidence that the relative performance of constrained 
firms reflects monetary policy, credit conditions, or business cycles.” Subsequent research by 
Campello and Chen (2010), however, shows that macroeconomic conditions do affect the 
magnitude of the financial constraint factor, once one properly identifies cross-sectional variation 
in the extent of financing constraints, which they show Lamont et al. did not do.  
  In light of these theoretical and empirical findings, we chose four indicators to capture 
the sensitivity of firms to the credit-supply shock aspect of the crisis: (1) dividends to sales, (2) 
total debt to assets, (3) a dummy variable that is a threshold measure of potential financial 
distress, which distinguishes whether firms’ debt service payments are very high relative to their 
cash flows – firms that have debt service coverage greater than one are defined as “good 
coverage” firms, and (4) an interaction effect that considers the effect of leverage interacted with 
good coverage.  
Dividend payout is a useful indicator of the exogenous cost of external finance; firms 
with high dividend payout tend to have high cash flows relative to investment, and are relatively 
mature. Our three leverage measures allow us to distinguish between the effects of financial 
distress, per se, and the effect of the financial crisis in reducing the effective debt capacity of 
non-distressed firms with significant pre-crisis leverage ratios. In particular, the interaction of 
leverage and good coverage highlights this potential effect of the crisis. 
 
  Limits to Shock Factor Identification 
  We believe that our seven observable measures (the ratio of foreign sales, the ratio of 
foreign assets, the ratio of free floating shares, the share of firms traded, the dividend to sales 12 
 
ratio, the leverage ratio, and the interest coverage) capture firms’ sensitivities to the three 
categories of “shock factors” reasonably well. Our identification assumptions linking each of 
these seven observable variables primarily to one of the three shock factors (global product 
demand shocks, market sell-off pressure shocks, and credit-supply shocks) are plausible, but we 
recognize that all three shock factors probably affect each of the seven observable variables to 
some extent. For example, firms with high pre-crisis costs of external finance will be more 
sensitive to reductions in cash flow (related to contractions in product demand) than other firms, 
even if credit supply were not declining. Nevertheless, we believe that the three sets of variables 
are naturally divisible into three groups based on our priors about the factor to which one would 
expect them to be most closely related. 
 
III.   Methodology and Data 
To explore the role of crisis-related “shock factors” in driving the performance of firms’ 
stocks we estimate a cross-section model of returns represented by equation (1) 
yf,i,c = 1Standard Risk Factorsf + 2Crisis Shock Factorsf + i+ γc + f,i,,c     (1) 
where f represents the firm, i the industry,  and c the country where each firm operates. The 
dependent variable in our study, yf,i,c, is the return of each firm f, in each industry i, and each 
country c. Standard Risk Factors refer to a set of variables which the asset pricing literature have 
shown to drive expected results (Sharpe, 1964; Fama and French, 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, 
and Vishny,  1994; Ang et al., 2006, 2009). The Crisis Shock Factors are our proxies for firms’ 
credit supply sensitivity, global demand sensitivity, and stock market selling pressure sensitivity. 
Following Tong and Wei (forthcoming) and Whited and Wu (2006), we incorporate the standard 
risk factors and the crisis shock factors  by entering the relevant firm characteristics directly into 13 
 
the regression, rather than entering them indirectly first going through a factor model. i and γc 
are industry and country fixed effects, respectively, and f,i,c is the firm level error term. We 
estimate our model with clustered standard errors to allow for within-country across-firms 
correlation of error terms.  
We estimate equation (1) over two periods: the crisis period and a placebo (non-crisis) 
period. Crisis period returns are measured over the period August 2007 through December 2008. 
Most firm characteristics are measured at December 2006.
10 The placebo period encompasses 
returns from August 2005 through December 2006, with most firm characteristics measured at 
December 2004. Table 1 lists the countries along with the number of firms included in each 
sample. We only consider countries with at least 20 firms. The crisis period includes 17,127 
firms operating in 44 countries, while during the placebo period our sample consists of 15,595 
firms operating in 45 countries.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for returns, standard risk factors, and crisis shock 
factors during the crisis and placebo periods. Data on returns come from Datastream. Table 2 
shows that firm returns average -47 percent over the crisis period. The standard deviation of 
returns over the crisis period is 32 percent. During the placebo period, returns average 29 percent 
and the standard deviation is 54 percent. 
The independent variables used in our analysis come from Worldscope, a commercial 
database produced by Thomsom Reuters, which provides financial statement data for most listed 
firms around the world. Standard Risk Factors follow Tong and Wei (forthcoming) and include: 
                                                            
10 The firms’ beta vis-a-vis the global market portfolio is calculated over the period December 2001 through 
December 2006 for the crisis period regressions. For the placebo regressions, beta is calculated over the period 
December 2000 through December 2005. Momentum (i.e., a measure of returns six month prior) is calculated over 
the period January 2005 through June 2005 for the placebo period and for January 2007 through June  2007 for the 
crisis period. 14 
 
the beta of each firm vis-a-vis the global market, the standard deviation of the beta residual (i.e., 
the standard deviation of the error from the estimation of the beta vis-a-vis the global market), 
the log of firm assets, a measure of momentum, and the market to book value ratio. The beta of 
each firm vis-a-vis the global market is the coefficient from regressing each firm’s stock return 
on the return from a global portfolio as captured by the FTSE World Index. The capital asset 
pricing model of Sharpe (1964) predicts that individual stock returns will be driven by the 
correlation of each firm with the market’s return. Because stock markets around the world have 
become increasingly integrated (see, for example, Bekaert et all, 2010), we consider the 
correlation or beta vis-a-vis a world portfolio as opposed to the local market. For the crisis period 
beta is measured over the period December 2001 and December 2006 and averages 0.72. For the 
placebo period beta is calculated over the period December 2000 through December 2005 and 
averages 0.79. The standard deviation of beta is 0.59 in both periods.  
Following Ang et al. (2006, 2009), we also include the standard deviation of the error 
term from the regressions used to calculate beta. The average of this variable during the crisis 
period is 11.6, while it averages 11.9 during the placebo period. 
Fama and French (1992) have shown that aside from beta, firms’ expected returns are 
driven by firms’ size and market to book value ratios. We measure firm size by the log of asset 
measured in dollars. The average for this variable during the crisis period is 11.6 (109,097 
dollars) and the standard deviation is 2.1 (8.6 dollars). For the placebo, the log of assets averages 
11.5 ( 98,715 dollars) and the standard deviation is 2.09 (8.1 dollars). The market to book value 
ratio is equivalent to the number of firms outstanding multiplied by the price of the shares, 
divided by the book value of equity. For the crisis period, the mean market to book value ratio is 15 
 
2.51 and the standard deviation is 2.80. This variable averages 2.10 during the placebo period, 
with a standard deviation of 2.45. 
 Following Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), we also include among the standard 
risk factors a measure of momentum, defined as each firm’s return over the six month period 
prior. For the crisis period, this refers to January 2007 through June 2007. For the placebo 
period, momentum is measured over the period January 2005 through June 2005.  The mean of 
momentum is 29 percent during the crisis, while it is 0 percent during the placebo period.  
Among the crisis shock factors, we include a number of variables to measure firms’ 
sensitivity to credit supply shocks, namely: the ratio of dividends to sales, the leverage ratio, 
good coverage – a dummy equal to 1 for firms with interest coverage ratios above 1- and the 
interaction between leverage and good coverage, which we label leverage_good coverage. The 
interest coverage ratio is defined as the ratio of earnings to interest expenses. It measures the 
ability of firms to meet their debt obligations. Hence, the dummy variable we use captures the 
share of firms for which their earnings exceed their debt obligations. Table 1 shows that 75.4 
(75.3) percent of firms have interest coverage ratios above 1 during the crisis (placebo) period. 
The average leverage ratio is 0.21 during both the crisis and the placebo period, and the standard 
deviation in both periods is close to 0.20.  
Our estimations include two variables to capture firms’ sensitivity to stock selling 
pressures: the ratio of shares traded and the share of stocks free floating. The former is defined 
as the number of shares traded over the number of shares outstanding, while the share of stocks 
free floating is the number of shares free floating (not held by insiders) over the total number of 
shares outstanding. Both of these variables are indicators of the ease with which firms’ stocks 
can be traded. The average for the volume traded is 0.11 during the crisis and 0.10 during the 16 
 
placebo period. The mean ratio of free floating shares is 68 percent during the crisis and 64 
percent during the placebo.  
We capture firms’ sensitivity to global demand shocks by including the share of foreign 
(overseas) sales to total sales and the ratio of foreign assets to total assets. For the crisis and 
placebo periods, the share of foreign sales averages 0.31. The ratio of foreign assets to total 
assets averages 0.19 during the crisis period and 0.17 during the placebo period. 
  In some estimations, instead of including each of the individual variables that enter as 
indicators of firms’ sensitivities to the three shock factors (demand sensitivity, credit supply 
sensitivity and selling pressure sensitivity), we compute the first principal component for each 
set of variables and use the standardized principal component of each set of variables to capture 
the effect of a particular shock factor. In particular, Standardized Credit Supply Shock Factor is 
the first principal component of the leverage ratio, good coverage, and the dividend to sales ratio. 
The Standardized Selling Pressure Shock Factor is the principal component of the ratio of shares 
traded over total shares and the ratio of free floating shares over total shares, while the 
Standardized Global Demand Shock Factor is the principal component of the share of foreign 
assets and the share of foreign sales. The principal components are standardized by subtracting 
the mean and dividing by the standard deviation. This facilitates the comparison of marginal 
effects across variables. 
  We also conduct estimations replacing the individual credit supply, selling pressure, and 
global demand sensitivity ratios with a set of dummies that separate firms in different categories, 
depending on the values of the individual ratios. For each of the three categories of shocks we 
sort firms in three groups: Group A contains the firms that a priori are likely to be the most 
sensitive to the shock, Group B contains the firms that have middle degree of sensitivity and 17 
 
Group C contains firms with least sensitivity to the shock (Group C is the omitted category in the 
regressions).
11  
In the case of the credit supply sensitivity ratios, Group A contains firms that have low 
interest coverage (i.e. “good coverage” equals to zero). These are “distressed” firms that cannot 
meet their debt obligation with their cash flows. In addition, firms with good coverage but high 
debt levels (above 80th percentile) and zero dividends also belong to this group. These firms 
have the lowest debt capacity and are likely to be the most affected by the credit supply shock. 
Group B contains firms with good coverage and which either have high debt but pay dividends, 
or those that have moderate debt but do not pay dividends.
12 This group has some vulnerability 
to credit supply shock. Group C contains the rest of the firms. In our sample 29% of all firms are 
classified as Group A, 19% as Group B and about 52% as Group C.  
In the case of the selling pressure sensitivity ratios, Group A contains firms with either 
high volume traded and/or high free float, Group B contains firms with medium levels of volume 
traded and free float and Group C contains all other firms.
13 In our sample 13% of firms are in 
group A, 32% are in group B and 54% in group C.  
We also include the following dummies based on the global demand sensitivity ratios: 
Group A contains firms with either high foreign sales and/or high foreign assets, Group B 
contains firms with medium levels of foreign sales and assets and Group C contains all other 
                                                            
11 Our results do not change significantly if we modify the specific criteria we use to separate firms into these 
groups.. 
12 Specifically, Group B contains firms that have moderate debt levels (i.e. fall between 60
th and 80% percentile of 
debt distribution) and have no dividends, or firms that are high in debt (above 80
th percentile) but have non-zero 
dividends.  
13 Specifically, we consider high volume traded or free float to be above 80
th percentile and medium to be between 
60
th and 80
th percentiles. If one of the two measures is high and the other is either high or medium, the firm is in 




14 In our sample 23% of all firms are in Group A, 15 % are in Group B and 62% are in 
Group C. In all three categories of shocks Group C contains about half the firms, which helps us 
isolate the most sensitive firms into groups A and B.  
 
IV.   Empirical Results 
  In Table 3, we begin by reporting results for six regressions, estimated over the crisis 
period August 2007-December 2008, in which each of the eight variables that we use to capture 
the crisis shock factors enters separately in the regressions, and a seventh regression for the 
“placebo” period of August 2005-December 2006.  
  The first three columns in Table 3 consider regressions in which all three types of crisis 
shock factors are present (where we alternately omit one of the three leverage measures to 
demonstrate the effects of doing so). The fourth through sixth columns of Table 3 include the 
three sets of crisis shock factor variables one at a time.  All regressions include controls for 
standard risk factors relating to expected returns, as discussed in Section III, which are not 
discussed here.
15 We focus our discussion on the crisis shock factors. 
For the crisis period, the measured coefficients on variables associated with each of the 
three sets of shock factors do not change much as the result of including or excluding variables 
associated with the other two sets of crisis shock factors. We find statistically significant and 
economically important effects for all three categories of shock factors. With respect to selling 
                                                            
14 Specifically, we consider high foreign assets or foreign sales to be above 80
th percentile and medium to be  
between 60
th and 80
th percentiles. Similar to selling pressure groups, if one of the measures is high and the other is 
either high or medium, the firm is in Group A, if both are medium, or one is high and the other one is low, the firm 
is in Group B. The rest are in group C.  
15 All regressions also include country level and industry level fixed effects. Furthermore, standard errors are 
clustered by country. 19 
 
pressure effects, both the share of free float and the share of stocks traded consistently enter 
negatively and statistically significantly in the regressions.  With respect to the global demand 
shock factor, the coefficient on the proportion of foreign sales is consistently negative and 
statistically significant, and the coefficient on the foreign assets share is consistently negative, 
but not statistically significant. This is not surprising since foreign assets, which captures the 
extent to which a firm’s production is multinational, is not directly related to global trade, while 
foreign sales are.  
The four corporate finance indicators used to measure the sensitivity to credit supply 
shocks (dividends to sales, leverage, good coverage, and the interaction between leverage and 
good coverage) generally enter with the predicted signs and are statistically significant. 
Dividends to sales enters positively, indicating that firms with higher pre-crisis payout tended to 
experience higher residual returns during the crisis. Leverage enters negatively and good 
coverage enters positively, and the interaction between the two also enters negatively and 
significantly.  
During the placebo period, leverage effects are absent, with the exception of a positive 
coefficient on the good coverage-leverage interaction term, which is significant at 10% only. In 
other words, during non-crisis periods, firms that are highly leveraged and face a significant 
prospect of financial distress (those whose debt service commitments are extremely high relative 
to their income) experience negative expected returns. A similar finding has been noted in prior 
work by Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2006), who document that the probability of financial 
distress is associated with negative stock returns for U.S. firms for the past thirty years.   
Clearly, the effect of the credit supply shock factor components is very different between 
the crisis and placebo periods. During non-crisis times only distressed firms have negative 20 
 
returns (i.e., those with interest coverage below one), while during crisis time we find that not 
only firms in distress have negative returns, but even firms with high leverage that are not 
distressed also have negative returns. Also, firms with high dividend payout experience higher 
returns during the crisis, but not during the placebo period.  
Similarly, with respect to the other two shock factors, we find that the variables capturing 
the global demand shock factor or the market liquidity shock factor are insignificant during the 
placebo period, confirming that these variables capture shocks that are crisis-specific. 
In Table 4, we use the eight variables that collectively proxy for the three shock factors to 
construct first principal components for each of the three categories of shock factors and report 
those results, as well as the results based on the Group A, B, and C categorizations of the three 
shock factors, as described in Section III. We label those alternative ways to summarize the 
overall effects of each of the three crisis-related shock factors the “principal components” 
approach and the “group” approach. The first two columns of Table 4 report coefficients for the 
crisis period, and the second two columns report effects for the placebo period.  
The principal-components regressions in Table 4 confirm the results reported in Table 3 
since we find that all three principal components are negative and statistically significant. 
Furthermore, these results suggest that the effect of the crisis shock factors is also economically 
significant. A one standard deviation increase in the principal component for the credit supply 
shock factor is associated with a decline in returns of 2.7 percent; an increase in the selling 
pressure shock factor has a similar impact on returns. A one standard deviation increase in the 
global demand shock factor translates into a fall of 1.5 percent. 
During the crisis, for all three factors, using the group approach, the Group A effects are 
larger and more statistically significant than the Group B and Group C effects. In particular, 21 
 
firms that fall in the Group A category for the credit supply shock factor exhibit returns that are 5 
percent lower than firms in Group C. At the same time firms in the Group A category for the 
global demand and selling pressure shock factors have returns that are 3 and 4 percent lower, 
respectively, than those for Group C firms in each category.  In the case of the variables which 
capture sensitivity to credit-supply shocks, the Group B effect is also negative and statistically 
significant relative to the omitted Group C, and returns for Group B firms are approximately 3 
percent lower.  
In contrast, during the placebo period, under the principal-components approach, none of 
the shock factors is significant. Under the group approach, with the exception of the global 
demand sensitivity group A variable, which is marginally significant and positive while it was 
negative during the crisis, none of the other group variables are significant during the placebo 
period. Overall, the results in Table 4 confirm those using individual indicators of crisis shock 
factors.  
 
V. Robustness Checks 
We conduct a number of additional estimations to verify the robustness of our results. We 
use as the baseline results those reported in models (2) and (7) of Table 3. First, instead of 
calculating the beta vis-à-vis the global market index, we compute the beta for each firm vis- à -
vis its local stock market index. Second, because the number of firms varies by country, to 
reduce the potentially excessive influence of countries with a large number of firms, we conduct 
weighted least squares with weights proportional to the inverse of the square root of the number 
of firms in each country. Finally, we run separate estimations for developed and developing 
countries to ascertain whether our main findings are verified for both samples of countries.  22 
 
 Table 5 presents results for the crisis period and Table 6 shows the estimations for the 
placebo period. Using the local beta rather than the global beta does not change our main results 
in any significant way (see model (1) in Table 5 and 6). The same variables proxying for credit 
supply, selling pressure, and global demand shock factors are significant during the crisis period 
when we use the local beta instead of the global beta. As before, these variables are not 
significant in the placebo period. 
Running our estimations with weights proportional to the inverse of the square root of the 
number of firms does not lead to major changes in results either. The only noticeable change is 
that while the ratio of debt to assets is significant at 10 percent in the unweighted estimations, 
when we conduct weighted estimations, that variable is no longer significant. However, the other 
proxies for sensitivity to the credit supply shock (i.e., the good coverage indicator, the interaction 
of the coverage indicator with the leverage ratio, and the dividend to sales ratio) all remain 
negative and significant during the crisis (see model (2) Table 5) , while they are mostly not 
significant (or positive) during the placebo period (see model (2) Table 6). 
Our main findings are not driven by a particular sample of countries, since we are able to 
verify our findings among separate samples of developed and of developing countries. There are, 
however, some differences across samples with respect to which specific proxies are relatively 
important. The leverage ratio is significant during the crisis for developed countries, but not for 
developing countries. On the other hand, for developed countries the interaction between 
leverage and coverage is not significant, while it is significant for developing countries. 
Similarly, among the indicators of sensitivity to global demand shocks, the ratio of foreign assets 
matters for developed countries, while the ratio of foreign sales is significant for developing 
countries. Overall, however, we continue to find that the variables proxying for credit supply, 23 
 
selling pressure and global demand shock factors are significant during the crisis period but not 
during the placebo period. 
 
VI.   A Month-by-Month Analysis of the Cross-Section of Returns During the Crisis   
Having shown that residual returns for the crisis period as a whole varied importantly as 
the result of each of the three shock factors, we now turn to a more detailed analysis of the crisis 
period on a month-by-month basis. To do so, we ran separate monthly regressions for each 
month from August 2007 through December 2008, using the same specifications as those in the 
first two columns of Table 4. Figures 1-3, Panel A plot the coefficients and two times their 
standard errors for each shock factor principal component in each month using regressions 
analogous to those in column (1) of Table 4. Panel B in each of the figures plots Group A 
coefficient values and standard errors from column (2) of Table 4.  
We find that the effects of the crisis shock factors vary in intensity during the crisis in a 
manner that conforms to what one would expect. Time variation in the coefficients associated 
with the credit-supply sensitivity factor (Figure 1) are similar to those found in credit risk 
spreads that reflect the timing of credit-supply shocks. The first major change in both plots 
occurs in early 2008, followed by subsequent recovery in early 2008 and then a steep decline 
toward the end of 2008.  
The time variation in the coefficients associated with the global demand shock factor 
vary with the timing of the declines in exports (see Figure 2). Both show a drop in August 2007, 
a subsequent recovery, then another drop in late 2007, followed by a rising trend through the 24 
 
Spring of 2008, after which the trend is negative, culminating in a steep drop around November 
2008. 
The variation over time in the coefficients that measure the sensitivity to selling pressure 
closely tracks the variation in the returns to the stock market. Peaks and troughs of returns are 
closely related to peaks and troughs in the coefficients of the selling pressure indicators (see 
Figure 3). The time variation in these three sets of coefficients confirms our interpretation of the 
coefficients relating to the three shock factors as reflecting three unique, crisis-related influences 
on residual returns.  
 
VII.   Conclusion 
  Equity returns provide a uniquely comparable window to the performance of firms 
throughout the world, and their responses to financial crises. The global financial crisis of 2007-
2008 posed exceptional challenges for firms, which implied unique determinants of equity 
returns. The collapse of global trade caused a major shock to demand for firms that had 
positioned themselves to benefit from participating in expanding global trade and production. 
Credit-supply contraction curtailed the access of firms to funding and reduced their effective 
debt capacity (which affected not only firms on the verge of financial distress, but also 
moderately levered firms).  Firms whose equity was relatively liquid, and therefore, easier to 
trade, found their stock prices falling more than other firms, as investors who owned stock and 
were scrambling for cash chose to sell off relatively liquid stocks, in order to limit their losses 
from disposing of assets in an illiquid market.  25 
 
All three of these crisis “shock factors” – exposure to the collapse in global trade 
demand, vulnerability to credit-supply shocks, sensitivity to stock market selling pressures – are 
reflected in the large and statistically significant observed patterns in residual equity returns 
(after controlling for normal risk factors that are associated with expected returns). We construct 
a vector of eight variables that measure the effects of the three crisis-related shock factors from 
August 2007-December 2008 – four variables that measure vulnerability to credit-supply shocks, 
two that measure exposure to global trade demand shocks, and two that measure sensitivity to 
stock market selling pressure. These eight variables enter with the expected sign and are 
significant statistically. The three sets of influences are unique to the crisis. Similar analysis for 
the placebo period of August 2005-December 2006 shows that the influences identified during 
the 2007-2008 sample period are not present in this non-crisis period. 
Using the eight variables we identify as measures of firms’ exposures to one of the three 
shock factors, we construct composite measures of each shock factor in two ways: using the first 
principal component of each of the variables included in the relevant set of variables, or by 
constructing indicator variables that group firms according to their combined values of the 
various indicators. The composite effect regressions confirm the unique importance of the shock 
factors during the crisis.   
A month-by-month analysis of the magnitude of the influence of each of three factors 
shows that the time variation of the importance of each of the shock factors tracks related 
changes in the global economic environment. The time variation in the coefficients associated 
with the global trade demand shock factor vary with the timing of the declines in exports. Time 
variation in the coefficients associated with the credit-supply factor are similar to those found in 
credit risk spreads that reflect the timing of credit-supply shocks.  The variation over time in the 26 
 
coefficients that measure the market illiquidity shock factor closely tracks the variation in the 
returns to the stock market. 
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Table 1: Sample of countries and firms  
Countries 
 
Number of firms 
Crisis period  Placebo 
Argentina    66  63 
Australia 1388  1197 
Austria 72  65 
Belgium 108  95 
Brazil 269  254 
Canada    1369  1368 
Chile 149  151 
China 1649  1388 
Colombia    0  26 
Czech Republic           25  38 
Denmark 105  103 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  42  32 
Finland 118  120 
France 618  618 
Germany 656  606 
Greece 255  278 
Hong Kong, China  759  754 
Hungary 28  32 
India 859  506 
Indonesia 237  238 
Ireland 64  61 
Israel 153  149 
Italy 231  202 
Japan 1213  1145 
Korea, Rep.  958  878 
Luxembourg 28  31 
Malaysia 874  833 
Mexico 105  109 
Netherlands 145  149 
New Zealand  109  105 
Norway 176  147 
Pakistan 89  73 
Peru 63  53 
Philippines 134  119 
Poland 212  145 
Portugal 46  53 
Russian Federation    148  89 
Singapore 551  527 
South Africa          254  246 
Spain 99  104 
Sweden 344  277 
Switzerland 181  182 
Thailand 408  369 
Turkey 172  187 
United Kingdom      1598  1430 




Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variables  Crisis period  Placebo period 
   N  Mean  Std Dev.  N  Mean  Std Dev. 
Return  17127  -0.47  0.32  14898  0.29  0.54 
Beta   15829  0.72  0.59  14579  0.79  0.59 
Momentum  16160  0.29  0.5  14096  0  0.27 
Market to book value  16061  2.51  2.8  14001  2.1  2.45 
Logarithm of total assets in USD  17127  11.59  2.09  14898  11.53  2.1 
Standard error of residuals from beta  15907  11.6  3.91  14728  11.89  4.07 
Good coverage  15082  0.75  0.43  13299  0.75  0.43 
Leverage ratio (debt to assets)  16925  0.21  0.19  14721  0.21  0.2 
Dividends over sales  14103  0.02  0.04  12745  0.02  0.04 
Ratio of free floating shares to total shares  14073  68.17  27.81  11523  64.32  28.04 
Ratio of shares traded to total shares  15928  0.11  0.18  13907  0.1  0.2 
Foreign assets to total assets  17127  0.19  0.2  14898  0.17  0.19 
Foreign sales to total sales  17127  0.31  0.26  14898  0.31  0.26 
Construction  industry dummy  17127  0.09  0.29  14898  0.09  0.29 
Mining industry dummy  17127  0.15  0.35  14898  0.13  0.33 
Retail trade industry dummy  17127  0.05  0.21  14898  0.05  0.23 
Services industry dummy  17127  0.24  0.43  14898  0.25  0.43 
Transport, communication, electricity, gas, 
and  sanitary industry dummy 




Table 3: Estimations using individual indicators of “crisis shocks” 
Table shows estimations for returns over the crisis (August 2007-December 2008) and placebo (August 2005- 
December 2006) periods. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote  
statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
   Crisis  Placebo  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Beta  -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.019*** -0.024*** 0.025* 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013) 
Momentum  -0.027** -0.027** -0.027** -0.033***  -0.041***  -0.042***  0.125*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.008)  (0.012)  (0.01) (0.031) 
Market to book value ratio  -0.002  -0.001 -0.001 -0.003***  -0.002*  -0.002***  -0.008* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Logarithm of total assets   0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.003  0.002 0.000 0.031*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
Standard dev. beta residuals  -0.015***  -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.017*** -0.012*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Dividends to sales  0.318*** 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.339***     -0.168 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.066)      (0.209) 
Good coverage dummy  0.025*** 0.045*** 0.056*** 0.041***     0.019 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)     (0.029) 
Leverage  ratio  -0.097***  -0.044*   -0.03    -0.097 
  (0.019) (0.024)   (0.022)     (0.075) 
Good coverage *leverage     -0.079***  -0.122***  -0.071***      0.135* 
    (0.027) (0.023) (0.02)      (0.072) 
Ratio of shares free float  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***    -0.001***    -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Ratio of shares traded  -0.084***  -0.084***  -0.085***    -0.04    0.027 
  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)   (0.05)    (0.046) 
Ratio of foreign to total assets   -0.028 -0.027 -0.028     -0.031*  0.086 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)     (0.018) (0.072) 
Ratio of foreign to total sales  -0.050** -0.051** -0.050**     -0.054** -0.027 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)     (0.024) (0.037) 
Constant  -0.197*** -0.214*** -0.222*** -0.219*** -0.188**  -0.200**  -0.012 
  (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.063) (0.09)  (0.082) (0.092) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,104  10,104  10,104 11,517 13,030 14,889 8926 
R-squared  0.196 0.196 0.196 0.193 0.184 0.19  0.141 




Table 4: Estimations using composite indicators of “crisis shocks” 
Table shows estimations for returns over the crisis (August 2007-December 2008) and placebo (August 2005-December 2006) 
periods. Robust standard errors, clustered by country, are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent respectively. 
   Crisis   Placebo  
Beta   -0.021***  -0.023***  0.025*  0.025** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) 
Momentum -0.028**  -0.029***  0.128***  0.127*** 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.031)  (0.03) 
Market to book value ratio  -0.001 -0.001 -0.008*  -0.008* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Logarithm of total assets  0.000  -0.001  0.033***  0.031*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
Standard dev. beta residuals  -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Standardized principal component credit supply shock factor -0.027***    -0.013   
 (0.004)    (0.01)   
Standardized principal component global demand shock factor  -0.015**    0.008   
 (0.006)    (0.01)   
Standardized principal component selling pressure shock factor  -0.026***    0.001   
 (0.005)    (0.007)   
Group A credit supply shock factor    -0.051***    -0.024 
   (0.007)    (0.022) 
Group B credit supply shock factor    -0.032***    0.019 
   (0.008)    (0.014) 
Group A global demand shock factor    -0.028*    0.028* 
   (0.014)    (0.016) 
Group B global demand shock factor    0.007    -0.018 
   (0.021)    (0.017) 
Group A selling pressure shock factor    -0.040**    0.016 
   (0.015)    (0.027) 
Group B selling pressure shock factor    -0.013    0.007 
   (0.014)    (0.015) 
Constant -0.260***  -0.200***  -0.022  0.001 
  (0.065) (0.073) (0.082) (0.08) 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,104  10,104  8,926  8,926 
R-squared  0.195 0.189 0.139 0.14 




Table 5: Robustness checks for the crisis period 
 
Table shows estimations for returns over the crisis period (August 2007-December 2008).  Robust standard errors, clustered by 
country, are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 Local  beta  Weighted  Developing  Developed 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Beta -0.030**  -0.026***  -0.028***  -0.017* 
  (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Momentum  -0.026** -0.026** -0.031** -0.014 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016) 
Market to book value ratio  -0.002  -0.002  0.000  -0.002** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Logarithm of total assets  0.002  -0.002  0.003  0.002 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Standard dev. beta residuals   -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.013*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Dividends to sales  0.318***  0.333***  0.241**  0.377*** 
  (0.068) (0.070) (0.089) (0.104) 
Good coverage dummy  0.043***  0.049***  0.051***  0.044*** 
  (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) 
Leverage ratio  -0.051**  -0.030  0.020  -0.092*** 
  (0.024) (0.035) (0.039) (0.028) 
Good coverage *leverage  -0.071**  -0.107**  -0.154***  -0.016 
  (0.028) (0.042) (0.041) (0.030) 
Ratio of shares free float  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ratio of shares traded  -0.085***  -0.097***  -0.069**  -0.111*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.031) (0.033) 
Ratio of foreign to total assets  -0.034  -0.026  -0.007  -0.050* 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.025) 
Ratio of foreign to total sales  -0.047*  -0.049**  -0.088***  -0.020 
  (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.024) 
Constant -0.215***  0.007  -0.138*  -0.287** 
  (0.068) (0.057) (0.072) (0.107) 
Industry  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  9,961 10,104  4,406 5,698 
R-squared  0.197 0.190 0.221 0.186 
Number  of  countries  44 44 23 21 
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Table 6: Robustness checks for the placebo period 
Table shows estimations for returns over the placebo period (August 2005-December 2006). Robust standard errors, clustered by 
country, are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
   Local  beta  Weighted  Developing  Developed 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Beta   0.031  0.013  0.015  0.027 
   (0.021)  (0.016)  (0.019)  (0.018) 
Momentum   0.125***  0.132***  0.130***  0.106** 
   (0.031)  (0.033)  (0.046)  (0.041) 
Market to book value ratio    -0.008*  -0.011***  -0.018**  -0.004 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
Logarithm of total assets    0.030***  0.029***  0.030***  0.029*** 
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Standard dev. beta residuals    -0.011***  -0.009***  -0.013**  -0.011*** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003) 
Dividends to sales    -0.169  -0.053  -0.130  -0.220 
   (0.216)  (0.210)  (0.405)  (0.129) 
Good coverage dummy    0.024  0.040  -0.026  0.041 
   (0.030)  (0.032)  (0.042)  (0.032) 
Leverage ratio    -0.087  -0.102  -0.167  -0.056 
   (0.076)  (0.080)  (0.127)  (0.087) 
Good coverage *leverage    0.121  0.153*  0.210**  0.123 
   (0.074)  (0.088)  (0.098)  (0.093) 
Ratio of shares free float    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ratio of shares traded    0.031  0.052  -0.005  0.117 
   (0.046)  (0.059)  (0.048)  (0.144) 
Ratio of foreign to total assets    0.088  0.104  0.052  0.098 
   (0.071)  (0.073)  (0.120)  (0.080) 
Ratio of foreign to total sales    -0.027  -0.056  -0.097*  0.011 
   (0.037)  (0.041)  (0.049)  (0.057) 
Constant   -0.003  -0.084  0.141  -0.077 
   (0.095)  (0.098)  (0.155)  (0.109) 
Industry fixed effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations   8,885  8,926  3,694  5,232 
R-squared   0.141  0.147  0.130  0.149 
Number of countries    45  45  24  21 
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Figure 1. Panel A.  
Principal Component Credit Supply Shock Factor Coefficients and Baa-Treasury spread 
 
 
Figure 1. Panel B.  






















Credit Supply Coeff Coeff-2std error




















Credit Supply Group A Coeff-2std error Coeff+2std error Baa-Treasury38 
 
Figure 2. Panel A.  
Principal Component Global Demand Shock Factor Coefficients and Exports 
 
 
Figure 2. Panel B.  
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Figure 3. Panel A.  
Principal Component Stock Market Selling Pressure Shock Factor Coefficients and S&P Returns 
 
 
Figure 3. Panel B   
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Selling Pressure Group A Coeff - 2std error
Coeff+2std error S&P, % change